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Abstract
Standard measures of multidimensional inequality (implicitly) assume com-
mon preferences for all individuals and, hence, are not sensitive to pref-
erence heterogeneity among the members of society. In this paper, we
measure the inequality of the distribution of equivalent incomes, which is
a preference-sensitive multidimensional well-being measure. To quantify
the contribution of preference heterogeneity to well-being inequality, we
use a decomposition method that calculates well-being inequality in dif-
ferent counterfactual distributions. We focus on four sources of well-being
inequality: the correlation between outcomes and preferences, the prefer-
ence heterogeneity, the correlation between the outcome dimensions, and
the inequality within each of the outcome dimensions. We ﬁnd that pref-
erence heterogeneity accounts for a considerable part of overall well-being
inequality in Russia for the period of 1995 to 2005.
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1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that a concern for inequality in society should go
beyond an exclusive focus on the income distribution and should also consider
the distribution of other dimensions that make life go well (see Stiglitz et al.
(2009)). This immediately raises the issue of how to aggregate the diﬀerent
life dimensions into a single measure of well-being inequality. Should one take
individual preferences into account in this aggregation procedure? If one decides
to use a preference-sensitive measure of multidimensional well-being inequality,
how large is the contribution of preference heterogeneity to overall inequality?
The standard approach to multidimensional inequality measurement general-
izes the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle to more dimensions and then directly
imposes it in the multidimensional space of outcomes.1 Although it is not
always made explicit, most existing multidimensional inequality measures per-
form a two-step aggregation with one aggregation across dimensions and another
across individuals. There are two possible sequences to perform these two ag-
gregations and, in general, both sequences lead to diﬀerent results (see Kolm
(1977), Dutta et al. (2003) and Decancq and Lugo (2012)). In the ﬁrst sequence,
one ﬁrst aggregates across the individuals in each dimension and then across the
dimensions (see, e.g., Gajdos and Weymark (2005)). From a normative point of
view, this procedure has a crucial drawback. It does not capture the cumulative
deprivation that occurs if the positions of the individuals across the diﬀerent
dimensions are correlated. This problem can be solved if one follows the second
sequence, in which one ﬁrst aggregates the outcomes across the dimensions of
well-being into a measure of well-being for each individual and then aggregates
the well-being measures across individuals. However, the speciﬁcation of the in-
dividual well-being measure that is used in the ﬁrst step is typically determined
by axioms that are formulated over the entire aggregation process and does not
necessarily relate to the literature on the measurement of individual well-being
(see Decancq et al. (2015b)).
A crucial question about these standard multidimensional inequality measures
is whether they respect individual preferences over the life dimensions and their
heterogeneity. In fact, it has been shown that they do not and even that they
cannot. There is a deep conﬂict between respecting the multidimensional Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle and respecting individual preferences (Fleurbaey and
1See Weymark (2006), Aaberge and Brandolini (2015), and Chakravarty and Lugo (2016)
for overviews of the literature on the measurement of multidimensional inequality.
2
Trannoy (2003)). We brieﬂy explain the issue in Section 2. This impossibility
result brings the literature to a crossroad. One route is to keep the multi-
dimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and, consequently, to neglect indi-
vidual preferences and their heterogeneity. This is the route taken by the stand-
ard approach to multidimensional inequality measurement. Alternatively, one
takes preferences seriously and calculates the inequality in the distribution of a
preference-sensitive well-being measure. This route leads to inequality measures
that do not satisfy the multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, but
a unidimensional transfer principle in the space of well-being measures. This
is the route that we explore in this paper. As an interpersonally comparable
measure of well-being we use the so-called equivalent income, which we also
introduce in the second section.2
In the empirical part of this paper we ﬁrst measure the inequality in equivalent
incomes in the Russian Federation between 1995 and 2005. To compute equi-
valent incomes and the inequality in their distribution, we estimate in Section
3 the - potentially heterogeneous - preferences of the respondents over their
expenditures, health, housing quality, unemployment, and wage arrears on the
basis of a life satisfaction equation.3
We are particularly interested in measuring the empirical relevance of prefer-
ence heterogeneity on well-being inequality. In Section 4 - the core of the paper
- we therefore construct various counterfactual distributions to decompose the
inequality in equivalent incomes into four components: the correlation between
outcomes and preferences, the preference heterogeneity, the correlation between
the outcome dimensions, and the inequality within each of the outcome dimen-
sions. We ﬁnd that, along with inequality in the expenditure and health di-
mension, preference heterogeneity accounts for a considerable part of well-being
inequality.
Section 5 conﬁrms the importance of preference heterogeneity through a decom-
position of well-being inequality within and between population subgroups with
the same preferences. Section 6 discusses how multidimensional dominance ap-
proaches relate to our measure of well-being inequality and how they tackle (or
do not tackle) preference heterogeneity. In Section 7, we conclude and brieﬂy
2Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) and Decancq et al. (2015a) discuss the axiomatic under-
pinnings of the equivalent income measure.
3We use panel data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) between
1995 and 2005. This data set has also been used to compute equivalent incomes by Decancq
et al. (2015a). Compared to that paper, we include two additional periods in the analysis and
use a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the life satisfaction equation.
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discuss the normative implications of our ﬁndings.
2 Measuring well-being inequality and respecting
preferences
Let there be a society of n > 1 individuals. The outcome vector `i = (`
1
i , `
2
i , . . . , `
m
i )
of each individual i contains her outcomes in the m > 1 dimensions of life. We
assume that the ﬁrst dimension `1i can be interpreted as income and the re-
mainingm−1 dimensions as non-income dimensions. Let L denote the (n×m)
outcome matrix, of which each cell `ji represents the outcome of individual i in
dimension j. The column with the outcomes of all individuals for the j−th
dimension is denoted `j .
We assume that each person i has a well-behaved preference ordering Ri over
the set of her outcome vectors. We interpret these preferences as the well-
considered judgements of the individual about what she considers a good life.4
The corresponding strict preference and indiﬀerence ordering are denoted Pi
and Ii. We model the preference of each individual Ri = R (ai) as a function
of a preference vector of k individual parameters ai =
(
a1i , a
2
i , . . . , a
k
i
)
. Let A
denote the (n× k) preference matrix which contains all n preference vectors in
the society.
We are interested in a measure of well-being inequality in the society I(L,A)
that uses the outcome matrix L and the preference matrix A as its arguments.
We follow the so-called two-step procedure to measure well-being inequality. In
the ﬁrst step of this approach, a well-being measure WB(`i, ai) is computed
for each individual, and then in the second step a standard one-dimensional
inequality index is applied to the well-being indices of the ﬁrst step:
I(L,A) = I (WB (`1, a1) , . . . ,WB (`n, an)) . (1)
The standard approach to multidimensional inequality measurement, on the
contrary, neglects the information contained in the preference matrix A and uses
a common well-being measure for all individuals, which depends on a vector of
parameters a, but not on their individual preferences. It can therefore be written
4As we know from the booming literature on behavioural economics, these well-considered
judgements are not necessarily revealed in choice behaviour.
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as
I(L) = I(WB(`1, a), . . . ,WB(`n, a)), (2)
with diﬀerent speciﬁc proposals corresponding to speciﬁc choices of I(·) and of
the well-being measure WB(·, ·).5 In the rest of this section, we ﬁrst explain
why the simpliﬁcation embodied in (2) is unavoidable if one wants to respect
the multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, and then we introduce
the equivalent income measure as one speciﬁc preference-sensitive proposal to
measure well-being.
2.1 The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian
A natural generalization of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle into a multidi-
mensional framework is the following (see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011)):
Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle. (L′, A′) is strictly
better than (L,A), if for all individuals k 6= i, j we have that `k = `′k and for
individuals i and j we have that for δ ∈ Rm+ \ {0}, `′i = `i + δ ≤ `j − δ = `′j .6
A situation is preferred to another situation if a positive bundle δ is transferred
from a donor whose outcomes are at least as good in all dimensions of life as
the receiver.7
The idea of respecting preferences and their heterogeneity can be expressed by
the Weak Pareto Principle:
Weak Pareto Principle . (L′, A) is strictly better than (L,A), if for all indi-
viduals i we have that `′i P (ai) `i.
The Weak Pareto Principle and the Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer
Principle conﬂict as soon as at least two individuals have diﬀerent preferences.
5Maasoumi (1986) has proposed a two-step multidimensional generalized entropy inequality
measure, for instance. Bosmans et al. (2015) interpret a normative two-step inequality measure
as a measure of the social welfare loss due to the suboptimal distribution of outcomes after
removing the social welfare loss due to its ineﬃciency.
6Let <,≤, and  denote the standard vector inequalities.
7Lasso de la Vega et al. (2010) derive a class of multidimensional inequality measures con-
sistent with this version of the Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle. However, in
the axiomatic literature on multidimensional inequality it is more common to consider trans-
fers where the transferred bundle is a fraction of the diﬀerence between the outcome vectors
of the donor and recipient of the transfer, and to drop the restriction that the outcomes of
the donor should be at least as good as the outcomes of the recipient in all dimensions (see
Weymark (2006), for instance). These modiﬁcations of the multidimensional Pigou-Dalton
Transfer Principle do not change the impossibility result discussed in this section, however.
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Figure 1: The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian
Figure 1 illustrates this conﬂict (see Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003) and Fleur-
baey and Maniquet (2011)). According to the Weak Pareto Principle, distribu-
tion matrix L1 is strictly better than L4, because for all individuals the outcome
vector in L4 is below the indiﬀerence curve containing their outcome vector in
distribution matrix L1. For the same reason, L3 is strictly better than L2. Ac-
cording to the Multidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle L2 is strictly
better than L1, and L4 is strictly better than L3. Combining these judgements
creates a cycle.
In fact, the conﬂict between these two principles is intuitive. The Weak Pareto
Principle requires that individual preferences are respected, whereas the Mul-
tidimensional Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle advocates equalizing transfers
irrespective of individual preferences. It only uses information on the outcome
matrix L and neglects all information concerning the preference matrix A. If one
assumes that inequality can be meaningfully measured using only the outcome
information in L, one implicitly imposes that the social evaluation is anonym-
ous in the space of outcomes, i.e., indiﬀerent between all permutations of the
individual outcome vectors (Kolm, 1977). As a result, the well-being measures
used to aggregate across dimensions must be identical for all individuals. This
is the assumption that leads to the move from eq. (1) to eq. (2). Alternatively,
if one wants to respect preferences and keep the more general framework of eq.
(1), one must choose a particular interpersonally-comparable representation of
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the preference ordering Ri for each individual as a well-being measure. We now
turn to that issue.
2.2 Inequality in well-being: equivalent incomes
By deﬁnition, a well-being measure that respects individual preferences is a
utility function that represents the preference ordering, i.e., it satisﬁes
WB(`i, ai) ≥WB(`′i, ai)⇔ `i R(ai) `′i. (3)
In general, what we would like to capture with a preference-based well-being
measure is the extent to which outcomes match individual preferences. Taking
preferences into account implies that two individuals with diﬀerent preferences
may reach a diﬀerent level of well-being, even if they are in the same objective
situation. Consequently, we have that I(L,A) and I(L,A′) may diﬀer. Consider,
for instance, two individuals with the same income, both living in a high-quality
house, but with a low level of health. While their objective situation is the
same, a preference-sensitive measure of well-being should be designed so that
the individual who cares (relatively) less about health and (relatively) more
about housing will reach a higher level of well-being.
It can be argued, however, that there are situations in which preference diﬀer-
ences should not matter for interpersonal well-being comparisons. Let us deﬁne
(̂`2i , . . . , ̂`mi ) as the vector that contains the optimal value in the non-income
dimensions for individual i. With heterogeneous preferences, these optimal val-
ues may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent individuals. If preferences with respect to life
dimension j are monotonic, the optimal value is the highest possible value for
that dimension. If individual i prefers to be as healthy as possible, for instance,
then her optimal value will be equal to perfect health. For other life dimen-
sions, however, the assumption of preference monotonicity may be less realistic.
Consider as an example the number of hours worked, where the optimal value
may diﬀer for a typical academic and a typical low-skilled blue-collar worker
(Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013)).
Now consider two individuals who both reach their own optimal outcome level
in all non-income dimensions. Our basic assumption for making interpersonal
well-being comparisons is that when comparing the well-being level of these
two individuals we can restrict ourselves to comparing their incomes, independ-
ently of their actual preferences. Why should their preferences matter if they
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reach their optimal outcome level in all non-income dimensions? As shown in
Decancq et al. (2015a), combining this assumption with respect for preferences
characterizes the well-being ordering that compares individuals in terms of their
equivalent incomes.8 The equivalent income is formally deﬁned as the solution
`1∗i to the equation
(`1∗i , ̂`2i , . . . , ̂`mi ) I(ai) (`1i , `2i , . . . , `mi ). (4)
In other words, it is the hypothetical level of income that, combined with the
optimal outcome level in the non-income dimensions, keeps the individual on
the indiﬀerence curve corresponding to her actual situation. If preferences are
monotonic with respect to income, this equivalent income `1∗i cannot be larger
than the actual income level `1i because (`
1
i ,
̂`2
i , . . . ,
̂`m
i )R(ai) (`
1
i , `
2
i , . . . , `
m
i ).
The equivalent income can be interpreted as the income corrected for the loss
in well-being associated with a suboptimal outcome level for the non-income
dimensions. This is an intuitively attractive way of capturing the idea of mul-
tidimensional deprivation, we believe. Moreover, it is conveniently measured
in monetary units, which provides a simple and familiar cardinal scale. In the
following, we measure well-being by means of equivalent incomes, i.e., we have
that WB(`i, ai) = `
1∗
i .
Once we have calculated an equivalent income for all individuals in society, we
can implement eq. (1) using any unidimensional inequality measure. In our em-
pirical application we will work with the Generalized Entropy class of inequality
measures (see Cowell (2011), and the references therein):
GEα(L,A) =
1
α(α− 1)n
[
n∑
i=1
(
WB (`i, ai)
µ
)α
− 1
]
, (5)
where µ is the average equivalent income 1n
∑n
i=1WB (`i, ai). The lower the
value of the parameter α, the more we focus on the bottom part of the distri-
bution of well-being measures. We will concentrate on the mean logarithmic
deviation (α = 0) and the Theil-index (α = 1) in this paper, because these
inequality measures have attractive decomposability properties.
This approach obviously satisﬁes the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle in the
space of well-being measures. Given the impossibility result discussed in the
8We do not discuss the normative strengths and weaknesses of this proposal here, but we
refer the interested reader to Decancq et al. (2015a,b) for a discussion.
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previous section, we know that eq. (5) does not satisfy the Multidimensional
Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle. However, the measure does satisfy a Restricted
Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle that only applies to situations involving the
optimal outcome levels in the non-income dimensions (̂`2i , . . . , ̂`mi ):
Restricted Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle. (L′, A′) is strictly better
than (L,A), if for all individuals k 6= i, j we have that `k = `′k and for individuals
i and j with outcomes `i = (`
1
i ,
̂`2
i , . . . ,
̂`m
i ) and `j = (`
1
j ,
̂`2
j , . . . ,
̂`m
j ) we have that
for δ ∈ R++, `′i = (`1i +δ, ̂`2i , . . . , ̂`mi ), `′j = (`1j−δ, ̂`2j , . . . , ̂`mj ) with `1i +δ < `1j−δ.
3 Equivalent incomes in Russia between 1995 and
2005
To compute equivalent incomes with real-world data, one needs information
about the preferences of the concerned individuals. For that purpose we will
exploit the ordinal information that can be derived from a life satisfaction equa-
tion (see Decancq et al. (2015a) for a similar procedure). We use data from the
nine waves of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) between
1995 and 2005.9 In this period, the Russian economy underwent sharp changes,
including a deep ﬁnancial crisis in August 1998. In the RLMS-HSE, life satis-
faction is measured by the question: To what extent are you satisﬁed with your
life in general at the present time? , with answers on an ordinal ﬁve point-scale
ranging from not at all satisﬁed to fully satisﬁed. We ﬁrst discuss the es-
timation of the life satisfaction equation and then brieﬂy explain how one can
compute equivalent incomes on the basis of these estimates.
3.1 Estimation of the life satisfaction equation
Let us denote the latent variable underlying the life satisfaction responses of
individual i in period t by S∗it. We can then specify the life satisfaction equation
as follows
S∗it = αi + γt +
5∑
j=1
(βj + µj ′Dit)× Γj(`jit) + δ′Zit + uit. (6)
9No data were collected in 1997 and 1999.
9
This life satisfaction equation includes ﬁve life dimensions.10 The ﬁrst three life
dimensions are measured by continuous variables: `1it denotes real equivalized
household expenditures (with the square root of household size as the equi-
valence scale); `2it denotes health, measured as a composite index of objective
disease indicators, using the weights obtained from an ordered logit regression
with self-assessed health as the dependent variable; `3it captures housing quality,
measured as the predicted value of a hedonic regression of self-reported housing
values on a number of housing characteristics (after controlling for regional price
diﬀerences, a time trend and household size). The ﬁnal two life dimensions are
binary indicators of unemployment (`4it) and wage arrears (`
5
it). The latter
indicator captures the phenomenon that wages were often not paid on time in
Russia during the late nineties.
We allow for the non-linearity of the life satisfaction equation (and hence for
less than perfect substitutability between the dimensions) through a so-called
Box-Cox transformation of the continuous dimensions j = 1, . . . , 3 (see Box and
Cox (1964)):
Γj(`jit) =

((
`jit
)
θj − 1
)
/θj when θj 6= 0.
ln
(
`jit
)
when θj = 0.
For the other two binary indicators, Γj is the identify function so that these
dimensions are not transformed. The scaling of life satisfaction in eq. (6) is
allowed to be inﬂuenced by a number of socio-demographic characteristics Zit
(education, social status, and marital status) that are introduced together with
time dummies γt as control variables. Moreover, we include individual ﬁxed
eﬀects αi to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity in time-invariant
characteristics including personality traits. To model preference heterogeneity
we include interaction eﬀects between the outcomes and four dummy variables
contained in Dit. These dummies capture whether the respondent is living in
a rural area, is young (below the age of 33), is male and has obtained higher
education. Finally, uit is a disturbance term.
The scalars βj and θj , as well as the vectors µj and δ, are coeﬃcients to be
estimated. Since the observed life satisfaction responses are measured on an
ordinal scale, we estimate an ordered logit model. We incorporate individual
ﬁxed eﬀects into the estimation using the approximation proposed by Jones
10More detailed information on the construction of the data can be found in Decancq et al.
(2015a) or obtained from the authors on request.
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and Schurer (2011) of the method discussed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
(2004), Frijters et al. (2004), and Frijters et al. (2006). The three Box-Cox
parameters of the continuous variables are chosen on the basis of a grid search
to maximize the overall ﬁt of the model. Standard errors are corrected for
clustering at the household level.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 1. The results for the full model
are shown in the rightmost column (Model 4). The results for the life dimen-
sions and the socio-demographic control variables are in line with what is usually
found in the literature. Interesting for our purposes are the interaction coeﬃ-
cients µj , as these coeﬃcients capture the heterogeneity in preferences. These
coeﬃcients will be treated as the preference parameters ai in the well-being
measure. Even with our restricted set of ﬁve life dimensions, many interac-
tions would need to be estimated. We therefore simplify the model by including
only the interaction eﬀects that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In fact, not
dropping the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients would lead to imprecisely computed equi-
valent income well-being measures and well-being distributions. The remaining
interaction terms in Model 4 can be interpreted easily. Unemployment has a
stronger negative eﬀect on the life satisfaction of older, higher educated males.
Expenditures are relatively more important for the higher educated in urban
areas. Young females give a relatively smaller weight to health. Housing mat-
ters more in rural areas, and less for the highly educated respondents. Finally,
the Box-Cox parameters of the continuous variables are shown at the bottom
of the column and are equal to -0.08, 0.46, and -0.36 (for expenditures, health,
and housing quality, respectively).
The other columns in Table 1 contain the results for restricted versions of the
full model. Model 3 imposes that θj = θ for the continuous dimensions. The
resulting estimate of θ equals 0.05. This restriction is close to being rejected by
a standard likelihood ratio test (χ2(2; 4.32) = 0.115), and is signiﬁcant from an
economic point of view. Model 2 keeps the diﬀerentiated Box-Cox parameters
but removes all preference heterogeneity. This restriction is clearly rejected on
statistical grounds (χ2(9; 59.24) = 0.000). Model 1 is the most restricted model
without interactions and with the same Box-Cox parameter for the three ﬁrst life
dimensions. It is therefore very close to the common homothetic speciﬁcation of
well-being without preference heterogeneity that is often (implicitly) used in the
standard multidimensional inequality measures (as in eq. (2)). This restricted
model is strongly rejected with respect to the full Model 4.
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We will use the estimates of Model 4 as presented in the right-most column of
Table 1 to compute the inequality in equivalent incomes in the next section,
except for one simpliﬁcation. Since the Box-Cox parameter of expenditures is
close to zero, we equalize it to zero and work with the logarithm of equivalized
expenditures as the relevant monetary life dimension. This brings us closer to
the speciﬁcation that is used in the bulk of the literature on life satisfaction
(See Layard et al. (2008), for instance). As will become clear in the following
subsection, this restriction also prevents the equivalent incomes from becoming
negative, which causes computational problems when calculating the General-
ized Entropy inequality measure.
3.2 Computation of the equivalent incomes
Let the satisfaction function Sit be the function that maps the outcome vectors
and preference parameters to the response to the life satisfaction question by
individual i in period t. These answers can be used to estimate preferences and
compute equivalent incomes if they are consistent with the preferences of the
respondents, i.e., if the following consistency assumption holds:
Sit(`it, ai) ≥ Sit(`′it, ai)⇔ `it R(ai) `′it. (7)
Under this consistency assumption, the life satisfaction function is one possible
utility function that provides a representation of the preference ordering of in-
dividual i, just as for the equivalent income well-being measure. Equivalent
incomes and the life satisfaction function have diﬀerent ways of attaching a
label to the indiﬀerence curves, however. In Decancq et al. (2015a), we have
argued that equivalent incomes are interpersonally comparable in a normatively
attractive way, whereas the life satisfaction functions are not.
To compute equivalent incomes, we ﬁrst determine for each individual her op-
timal outcome level in the non-income dimensions
(̂`2
i , . . . ,
̂`m
i
)
. The estimates
presented in Table 1 lead to preferences which are monotonic with respect to all
life dimensions, so that the optimal values will be the same maximal value for
all respondents. To be precise, they are set at being in perfect health, having
a high housing quality11, not being unemployed, and not suﬀering from wage
arrears.
11To avoid the results from being overly sensitive to outliers, we select the 90th percentile
value of the estimated housing values.
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Under the consistency assumption of eq. (7), we can use the deﬁnition of equi-
valent incomes given by eq. (4) and the econometric speciﬁcation of the life
satisfaction equation given by eq. (6) to write:
S∗it = αi + γt + (β
1 + µ1′Dit)× ln
(
`1it
)
+
5∑
j=2
(βj + µj ′Dit)× Γj(`jit) + δ′Zit + uit
= αi + γt + (β
1 + µ1′Dit)× ln
(
`1∗it
)
+
5∑
j=2
(βj + µj ′Dit)× Γj(̂`jit) + δ′Zit + uit,
which yields
`1∗it = `
1
it × exp
 5∑
j=2
βj + µj ′Dit
β1 + µ1′Dit
× (Γj(`jit)− Γj(̂`jit))
 . (8)
The shape of the indiﬀerence curves as measured by the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between the non-income dimensions and the income dimension (βj +
µj ′Dit)/(β1 + µ1′Dit) is of crucial importance in eq. (8). On the contrary, the
conditioning variables Zit, the ﬁxed eﬀects αi, the time trends γt, and the idio-
syncratic disturbance term do not appear in eq. (8). These variables only shift
the level of reported life satisfaction upwards or downwards, without aﬀecting
the marginal rates of substitution between the life dimensions. These shifts can
be interpreted as changes in aspirations and expectations, and are considered
irrelevant in making well-being comparisons by means of equivalent incomes.12
4 Decomposing well-being inequality
Once we have computed the equivalent incomes for all individuals in the sample,
we can immediately calculate the inequality I(L,A) or, more speciﬁcally, GEα(L,A)
as shown in eq. (5). We now want to analyse how sensitive this measure is to
the various components of the measure that have been explained in Section 2.
Does preference heterogeneity matter? How important is the issue of cumu-
lative deprivation, i.e., correlation between the outcomes? Does the answer to
the latter question depend on whether preference heterogeneity is taken into
account or not? We explain in section 4.1 how we simulate diﬀerent counter-
12See Decancq et al. (2015a) for a more extensive discussion of the computation of equivalent
incomes.
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factual distributions to give an empirical answer to these questions. The results
are discussed in section 4.2.
4.1 Construction of counterfactual well-being distributions
The central idea of our approach is to compare the well-being inequality I(L,A)
in the sample with the inequality in diﬀerent counterfactual well-being distri-
butions that are constructed by neutralizing one or more sources of well-being
inequality. As noted before, the matrix of preference parameters A contains
the estimates of the interaction coeﬃcients from the life satisfaction equation.
Given that vector Dit contains four dummy variables, we only have 16 diﬀer-
ent preference groups, and the preference matrix A contains a large number of
identical rows. We construct the following four counterfactual matrices for each
considered period:
Reshued preference matrix A˜. The matrix A˜ is a permuted version of
the preference matrix A, i.e., A˜=P · A, where P is an (n× n) permutation
matrix. This operation reshues entire vectors of preference parameters ai
across individuals. Each individual is randomly assigned a new preference vector
from the sample. Clearly, the resulting preference matrix A˜ is not unique. In
our empirical application, we will therefore generate 200 of these permutation
matrices and then provide information about the resulting distribution of the
inequality measures.
Equalized preference matrix A. The matrix A is an averaged version of A,
i.e., A=Q ·A for Q the (n× n) bistochastic matrix with 1/n in each cell. Note
that the resulting preference ordering R(a) is in some sense artiﬁcial, since it
is obtained by averaging the preference parameters and it does not necessarily
occur in the sample.
Reshued outcome matrix L˜. The matrix L˜ is a (dimension-wise) permuta-
tion of the outcome matrix L. Each dimension is obtained by ˜`j=P j · `j for P j
an (n× n) permutation matrix for dimension j. We randomly assign to each
individual an outcome from the sample. Since the resulting outcome matrix L˜
is not unique, we will again generate 200 diﬀerent reshued outcome matrices.
Equalized outcome matrix L. The matrix L is a (dimension-wise) averaged
version of the outcome matrix L. Each dimension is obtained by `
j
=Q ·`j for Q
the (n× n) bistochastic matrix with 1/n in each cell. We perform this averaging
dimension by dimension. Let L1 denote the outcome matrix where only the
15
incomes are equalized. The matrix L2 denotes the outcome matrix where income
and health are equalized. Similarly, L3 denotes the outcome matrix where
income, health, and housing are equalized and L4 denotes the outcome matrix
where income, health, housing, and unemployment are equalized. Finally, let
L5 = L denote the outcome matrix where all ﬁve dimensions are equalized.
For each counterfactual matrix, reshuing neutralizes the correlation and av-
eraging neutralizes the heterogeneity. With these counterfactual matrices as
building blocks, we can construct the ﬁrst decomposition of well-being inequal-
ity, which we will call the preferences-ﬁrst decomposition:
I(L,A) = (I(L,A)− I(L, A˜))︸ ︷︷ ︸
correlation
outcome− pref.
+ (I(L, A˜)− I(L,A))︸ ︷︷ ︸+
preference
heterogeneity
(I(L,A)− I(L˜, A))︸ ︷︷ ︸
outcome
correlation
+ (I(L˜, A)− I(L,A))︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
outcome
inequality
(9)
Note that we provide a full decomposition with I(L,A) = 0. While it is natural
to ﬁrst neutralize the correlation by reshuing and then to neutralize inequal-
ity by taking averages, there is no a priori reason to start by considering the
preference matrix A ﬁrst rather than the outcome matrix L. We will therefore
also consider an alternative decomposition of well-being inequality, which we
will call the outcomes-ﬁrst decomposition:
I(L,A) = (I(L,A)− I(L˜, A))︸ ︷︷ ︸
outcome
correlation
+ (I(L˜, A)− I(L,A))︸ ︷︷ ︸
outcome
inequality
+
(I(L,A)− I(L, A˜))︸ ︷︷ ︸
correlation
outcome− pref.
+ (I(L, A˜)− I(L,A))︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
preference
heterogeneity
(10)
Note that in the outcomes-ﬁrst decomposition we have that I(L,A) = I(L, A˜)
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by construction. When all individuals have the same outcome vector, permut-
ing the preference vectors does not aﬀect inequality. So, in the outcomes-ﬁrst
decomposition there is no eﬀect of the correlation between outcomes and pref-
erences on well-being inequality.
As is common with this type of decomposition, the results are path-dependent.
Therefore, the results of the preferences-ﬁrst and outcomes-ﬁrst decompositions
will be diﬀerent. Yet, we do not consider this path-dependence problematic
since our aim is not to obtain a unique decomposition, but rather to understand
the contribution of the diﬀerent components and the interactions between them.
Combining the results from both decompositions will therefore yield useful ad-
ditional insights.
4.2 Empirical results
Based on the preference estimates in Table 1, we can construct A˜, A, L˜, and L
for each considered period. With these building blocks we then construct various
counterfactual well-being distributions and compute the corresponding Gener-
alized Entropy inequality measures. The empirical results can be summarized
in four ﬁgures. Figures 2 and 3 show the results for the preferences-ﬁrst decom-
positions for GE0 and GE1 respectively. Figures 4 and 5 display the results for
the outcomes-ﬁrst decompositions for the same inequality measures. We now
discuss the results for each of the four steps in the sequence of the decomposition.
4.2.1 Correlation between outcomes and preferences
We look ﬁrst at the eﬀect of the correlation between outcomes and preferences
on well-being inequality. This eﬀect can be measured by looking at the ﬁrst term
in the preferences-ﬁrst decomposition given by eq. (9). This term quantiﬁes the
diﬀerence between the well-being inequality, computed using the actual outcome
and preference matrix I(L,A), and the counterfactual well-being inequality,
obtained from the actual outcome matrix and the reshued preference matrix
I(L, A˜).
The results are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The dark grey area around the line
I(L, A˜) shows the 95% conﬁdence interval caused by reshuing variance, i.e.,
variance which originates from the non-uniqueness of the reshuing procedure.
This conﬁdence interval is derived from the empirical distribution of the 200
17
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Figure 4: Outcomes ﬁrst: GE0(L,A), GE0(L˜, A), GE0(L,A), GE0(L, A˜), and
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Figure 5: Outcomes ﬁrst: GE1(L,A), GE1(L˜, A), GE1(L,A), GE1(L, A˜), and
GE1(L,A)
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inequality indices that are each computed with a diﬀerent reshued preference
matrix A˜. Similarly, the light grey area shows the 99% conﬁdence interval.13
The ﬁgures show that neutralizing the correlation between the outcomes and
preferences lowers well-being inequality. This inequality-reducing eﬀect of the
correlation between outcomes and preferences can be understood by consult-
ing Table 2, which, for each non-income dimension of life (j = 2, . . . , 5), shows
the Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient between the outcomes `jit and the
individual-speciﬁc marginal rates of substitution between that dimension and
the income dimension (βj +µj ′Dit)/(β1+µ1′Dit). This marginal rate of substi-
tution measures the willingness-to-pay for a small improvement in dimension
j. Individuals who care more about their outcomes in the non-income dimen-
sion (or less about their income) have larger marginal rates of substitution and
steeper indiﬀerence curves. The rank correlation coeﬃcients for the housing di-
mension in Table 2 are negative, for instance. Individuals who live in a relatively
low quality house and are further away from their own optimal outcome level
suﬀer relatively more from this hardship. The diﬀerence between the equivalent
income `1∗i and the actual income `
1
i is the loss in well-being of not reaching the
optimal outcome level; hence the negative correlations for the housing dimen-
sion further increase the diﬀerence between the well-being of those individuals
who do better and those who do worse on that dimension. This ﬁnding presents
a ﬁrst indication that it may be worthwhile to take preference heterogeneity
into account when measuring well-being inequality.
4.2.2 Preference heterogeneity
We now turn to the second term of the decomposition, which neutralizes the
preference heterogeneity by constructing a counterfactual distribution with the
averaged preference matrix A.14 The resulting counterfactual inequality meas-
ures in the preferences-ﬁrst decomposition I(L,A) use a common well-being
13This reshuing variance stemming from the non-uniqueness of the reshuing procedure
should not be confused with sampling variance. In this paper we do not estimate the sampling
variance of our results for several reasons. First, the additional conﬁdence bounds would
clutter the graphs and complicate the interpretation of results. Second, it is an open question
how to deal with sampling variance in the computation of equivalent incomes. Finally, and
most importantly, the RLMS-HSE data set does not provide suﬃciently detailed information
on the sampling procedure, so that the estimates of the sampling variance would at best
provide rough approximations.
14An alternative approach would have been to use the coeﬃcients of Model 2 in Table 1,
which is estimated without interaction terms and in which preference diﬀerences also have
been removed. The results for that approach are very similar to the ones presented here and
can be obtained from the authors on request.
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measure for all individuals and, in that sense, resemble the standard multidi-
mensional inequality measures of eq. (2). The diﬀerence between this standard
approach based on a common well-being measure and our heterogeneous ap-
proach shows up in the diﬀerences between I(L,A) and I(L,A) in Figures 2
and 3. After neutralizing the correlation between preferences and outcomes,
the net eﬀect of preference heterogeneity shows up in the diﬀerences between
I(L, A˜) and I(L,A).
The results are striking. Removing preference heterogeneity leads to a substan-
tial decrease in well-being inequality. The eﬀect of substituting the averaged
preference matrix A for the reshued matrix A˜ is larger than that of substitut-
ing the reshued matrix A˜ for the actual matrix A.
We make two further observations. First, the contribution of preference het-
erogeneity to well-being inequality remains quite stable over time. This is not
surprising since we have assumed that preferences are constant over time for
each person. Second, the contribution of preferences is relatively larger for GE0
than for GE1.
15 One possible interpretation is that individuals at the top of
the well-being distribution score well on their non-income dimensions, so there
is only limited room for preference heterogeneity to aﬀect their well-being. For
individuals at the bottom of the well-being distribution, on the contrary, the
relative weighting of their diﬀerent (larger) deprivations is more important.
The empirical relevance of preference heterogeneity on well-being inequality as
well as the diﬀerences with the standard multidimensional inequality measures
are further illustrated by the results of the outcomes-ﬁrst decomposition given by
eq. (10). The two bottom curves in Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution over time
of I(L,A) (which is equal to I(L, A˜)) and I(L,A) (which equals 0). The former
counterfactual captures inequality in the situation where all individuals have the
same averaged outcomes, but their own preferences. According to the standard
approach, which only uses information about L, this inequality is necessarily
equal to zero. As we discussed in section 2.2, however, there may be inequality
in well-being, even with identical outcomes, as soon as we introduce a concern
for preference heterogeneity. In fact, the ﬁgures show that this inequality is
substantial in our data. We return to the normative implications of this ﬁnding
in the conclusion.
15Additional calculations, which are not shown here, conﬁrm the pattern that preference
heterogeneity has a larger eﬀect as the inequality measure becomes more sensitive to the
bottom of the well-being distribution.
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Expenditures Health Housing Unemployment
1995 Health 0.0444
Housing 0.2296 -0.1062
Unemployment -0.0633 0.1363 -0.0649
Wage arrears 0.0104 0.1027 -0.0248 -0.1353
2000 Health 0.1226
Housing 0.2904 -0.0734
Unemployment -0.0744 0.1428 -0.0961
Wage arrears 0.0028 0.0538 -0.0658 -0.1094
2005 Health 0.1666
Housing 0.2023 -0.0821
Unemployment -0.1284 0.1736 -0.0936
Wage arrears -0.0046 0.0522 -0.0498 -0.0713
Source: Own computations with RLMS-HSE
Table 3: Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient between outcome dimensions
4.2.3 Correlation between outcomes
As described in the introduction, the phenomenon of cumulative deprivation,
i.e., the correlation between the outcomes, has played a prominent role in the
discussion on multidimensional inequality measurement (see Atkinson and Bour-
guignon (1982), Dardanoni (1996), and Tsui (1999), for instance).
In Table 3, we present the Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcients between each
pair of dimensions for 1995, 2000, and 2005. In line with the ﬁndings of Decancq
(2014), we see an increased rank correlation between the expenditure and health
dimension. Individuals who are top-ranked in the expenditures distribution
become more likely to also be top-ranked in the health distribution over the
considered period in Russia. Overall, however, the pattern of the correlation
coeﬃcients is mixed.16
The contribution of the correlation between the outcome dimensions to well-
being inequality can be seen in both decompositions. In the preferences-ﬁrst
decomposition of eq. (9) it is reﬂected by the term I(L,A)− I(L˜, A) and in the
outcomes-ﬁrst decomposition of eq. (10) by I(L,A)−I(L˜, A). The former shows
the eﬀect of the correlation between outcomes after preference heterogeneity has
16The impact that the increasing correlation between outcomes has on well-being inequality
is an empirical matter because it depends on the interplay between the degree of substitutabil-
ity and inequality aversion in both aggregation steps (see, e.g., Dardanoni (1996), Bourguignon
(1999), and Bosmans et al. (2015) for discussions).
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been removed, whereas the latter takes preference heterogeneity into account.
The results are shown in Figures 2 through 5, where the dark grey area around
the curves for I(L˜, A) and I(L˜, A) shows the 95% conﬁdence interval of the
reshuing variance originating from the 200 reshued outcomes matrices L˜.
The light grey area shows the 99% conﬁdence interval.
We see that the correlation between the outcome dimensions increases well-
being inequality and that the contribution increases over time. Moreover, the
contribution of the correlation between the outcomes has a stronger eﬀect in
the outcomes-ﬁrst decomposition when the preference heterogeneity has not
yet been neutralized. The increase in well-being inequality in the tumultuous
period between 1998 and 2000 seems to be largely driven by the contribution
of the correlation between the outcomes. As can be seen from Figure 4, a
counterfactual situation with a stable contribution of correlation over time would
have led to a decrease rather than an increase in well-being inequality.
4.2.4 Inequality in outcomes
Let us ﬁnally look at the fourth term of the decomposition, which captures
the contribution of the inequality in each of the outcome dimensions to overall
well-being inequality. Again, the results for the preferences-ﬁrst decomposi-
tion (Figures 2 and 3) are related to the results of the standard approach to
multidimensional inequality (since the preference parameters are ﬁxed for each
individual at a).
We neutralize the inequality in the diﬀerent dimensions in a speciﬁc order: ﬁrst
we average expenditures, followed by, consecutively health, housing quality, un-
employment, and wage arrears. In principle, this speciﬁc sequence may aﬀect
the results and other sequences may lead to diﬀerent results. Yet, since the equi-
valent income well-being measure as deﬁned by (8) is close to being additively
separable, this eﬀect is quite small, and reversing the sequence hardly changes
the results.17
Our ﬁndings are similar in the four ﬁgures.18 Overall, the most important
contributors to overall well-being inequality are the inequality in the expenditure
and health dimensions. Moreover, there is a remarkable increase in well-being
17Results are available from the authors on request.
18Since the non-averaged dimensions have been reshued in the previous step of the de-
composition, the non-uniqueness of the reshuing remains to cause some variance in the
counterfactual inequality measures. The more dimensions that are averaged, however, the
smaller this variance becomes.
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inequality due to the presence of wage arrears around 1996. The eﬀect of wage
arrears tapers oﬀ over time, however.
5 Subgroup decomposition by preference groups
An alternative approach to investigate the importance of preference hetero-
geneity on well-being inequality is based on a classic between-within subgroup
decomposition (see Cowell (2011)). We partition the sample into 16 preference
subgroups that are based on the socio-demographic characteristics captured by
the four dummies in Dit, i.e., the gender of the respondents, whether they have
obtained some higher education, whether they live in a rural area, and whether
they are young or not.
Following Cowell and Jenkins (1995), we look at the subgroup decomposition to
understand the importance of this particular partitioning in preference groups
for well-being inequality. We do that separately for I(L,A), I(L,A), and
I(L,A). The mean logarithmic deviation (GE0) and the Theil-index (GE1),
on which we have focused so far, have attractive decomposition properties. It
is indeed well-known that GEα can be additively decomposed in a within com-
ponent GEWα and a between component GE
B
α :
GEα(L,A) = GE
W
α (L,A) +GE
B
α (L,A),
where the between component is computed by setting all equivalent incomes in
each preference group equal to their group average, and the within component
is given by
GEWα (L,A) =
K∑
k=1
[
(vk)
(1−α)
]
× [(sk)α]×GEα(Lk, Ak),
with Lk and Ak being the outcome matrix and preference matrix for preference
subgroup k = 1, . . . ,K, vk = nk/n being the population share and sk the
equivalent income share. When α = 0 the inequality within the preference
groups is weighted by the population shares, whereas for α = 1, the equivalent
income shares are used.19
19In our data set, the equivalent income shares of the preference groups are more unequal
compared to the population shares. Young, urban respondents have a larger equivalent income
share and lower educated, rural respondents a lower equivalent income share compared to their
population share.
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1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GE0(L,A) 1.20 1.36 1.19 1.30 1.23 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.21
GEB0 (L,A) 0.41 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.45
GEW0 (L,A) 0.79 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.77 0.76
GE0(L,A) 0.80 0.95 0.85 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.81
GEB0 (L,A) 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
GEW0 (L,A) 0.68 0.79 0.71 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.64
GE0(L,A) 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.42
GEB0 (L,A) 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.42
GEW0 (L,A) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Own computations with RLMS-HSE
Table 4: Subgroup decomposition analysis for GE0
Tables 4 and 5 present the results.20 For I(L,A) the within component domin-
ates: since preferences are the same within each preference group, this compon-
ent captures the diﬀerences in outcomes between the individuals within each
preference group. The between component captures both outcome and prefer-
ence diﬀerences between the preference groups.
Additional insights can be obtained by looking at the decomposition of I(L,A).
Since all preferences are equalized in this counterfactual distribution, the between
component only reﬂects diﬀerences in outcomes between the preference groups.
The between component is now much smaller, suggesting that preference het-
erogeneity is an important contributor to the diﬀerences between the preference
groups. As can be seen from comparing both tables, the within-group inequality
is larger for the mean logarithmic deviation when with, rather than without,
preference heterogeneity; that is, GEW0 (L,A) > GE
W
0 (L,A), while the opposite
is true with the Theil-index, i.e., GEW1 (L,A) < GE
W
1 (L,A). This is in line with
our earlier ﬁnding that taking preference heterogeneity into account has a larger
eﬀect for inequality measures that focus more on the bottom of the well-being
distribution.
Finally, the subgroup decomposition of I(L,A) conﬁrms the ﬁndings of section
4.2. The within component now becomes zero, while the between component
captures the eﬀect of preference heterogeneity in the counterfactual situation
when all outcomes are averaged.
20The values in Tables 4 and 5 are the same as the corresponding ones in Figures 4 and 5.
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1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GE1(L,A) 0.84 0.97 0.88 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.78
GEB1 (L,A) 0.30 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32
GEW1 (L,A) 0.53 0.63 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.46
GE1(L,A) 0.71 0.85 0.76 0.75 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.68
GEB1 (L,A) 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
GEW1 (L,A) 0.60 0.69 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.53
GE1(L,A) 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.31
GEB1 (L,A) 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.31
GEW1 (L,A) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Own computations with RLMS-HSE
Table 5: Subgroup decomposition analysis for GE1
6 The dominance approach and preference het-
erogeneity
When computing multidimensional inequality with a common well-being meas-
ure WB(`i, a), the results will depend on the speciﬁc choice of the common
preference vector a. The dominance approach addresses this dependence by
taking an agnostic position on the precise shape of the common preferences and
by computing the results for classes of well-being measures that are character-
ized by restrictions on their cross-derivatives with respect to the outcomes (see
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and Trannoy (2006)). To some extent, this
agnosticism moves us away from the perfectionism that is implicitly underly-
ing the choice of a single well-being measure for all individuals. It comes at a
price, however. The resulting well-being inequality ranking may turn out to be
incomplete, meaning that some comparisons will be indecisive.
To illustrate, we implement the following well-being inequality ranking21:
L is more unequal than L′ ⇔ I(L, Â) ≥ I(L′, Â) ∀Â ∈ Â, (11)
where Â is the set of all preference matrices in which all individuals share
a common preference vector â that is observed in the sample. As we have
seen in the previous section, there are 16 diﬀerent preference groups in our
21A similar approach underlies sensitivity analyses, such as, for instance, the one by Maa-
soumi and Jeong (1985).
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1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1995 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 1 0 1 - 0 0 0 0
2002 0 1 0 1 0 - 0 0 0
2003 0 1 0 1 0 0 - 0 0
2004 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 0
2005 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 -
Own computations with RLMS-HSE
Table 6: Dominance test. A 1 means that the row year has a lower GE0 than
the column year for all observed preference parameters.
empirical analysis and, hence, 16 diﬀerent preference matrices Â. Clearly, this
dominance idea could be further generalized by checking the inequality in eq.
(11) for various members of some class of inequality measures - by testing Lorenz
dominance, for instance. However, testing dominance is not the purpose of this
paper and we only illustrate the approach for a single measure, which is the
mean logarithmic deviation GE0.
Table 6 presents the results for all pairwise year-by-year tests of the dominance
test given by eq. (11). A cell with a 1 denotes that the row year has a lower
well-being inequality according to GE0 for each of the 16 common preference
matrices Â. We see that all years are less unequal than 1996, and that most of
the years after 2000 are less unequal than 2000.
It is important to stress that the dominance approach does not take into account
the diversity in preferences in a given society at a given point in time. There
is an important diﬀerence between, on the one hand, looking for a unanimous
inequality ranking for diﬀerent well-being measures, each of them common to
all individuals in society, and on the other hand measuring well-being inequality
while respecting preference heterogeneity.
Although one has to interpret our ﬁndings cautiously, this diﬀerence can be
illustrated by comparing the results in Table 6 with those in Figures 2 and 4.
According to both approaches we ﬁnd that 1996 is more unequal than 1995 (and
more unequal than 1998). Yet, while 2000 was more unequal than 1998 based
on the ﬁgures, this is not found in the dominance results. This diﬀerence may
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have to do with the underlying causes of the increases in well-being inequality.
The increase in well-being inequality in 1996 is due to the sharp well-being loss
as a result of the presence of wage arrears, which is an objective phenomenon
that aﬀects the inequality for all preference matrices Â. The increase in 2000,
however, is mainly due to an increase in the eﬀect of the correlation between
outcomes, and the correlation between outcomes and preferences. Preference
diﬀerences are important for the evaluation of the former correlation and es-
sential for the latter correlations. This may explain why the sharp inequality
increase in 2000 is not reﬂected in the dominance results.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that preference heterogeneity constituted an important part
of well-being inequality in Russia between 1995 and 2005. All-in-all, we have
found that the main drivers of well-being inequality in the considered period
were preference heterogeneity, expenditure inequality, health inequality, and
wage arrears inequality (during the late 90s).
Some caveats apply, however. First, our empirical ﬁndings are based on one data
set only. In the period between 1995 and 2005, Russia was a speciﬁc setting,
characterized by large social and economic changes in a heterogeneous society.
It is not clear whether preference heterogeneity would be equally important in
other settings. Second, our method to estimate preferences on the basis of a
satisfaction equation is arguably rather primitive. In particular, the consist-
ency condition in eq. (7) is debatable and is hard to test empirically. Yet, one
could argue that the fact that we cannot identify individual preferences with
this method, but have to limit ourselves to only 16 diﬀerent preference groups,
strengthens our conclusion on the empirical relevance of preference heterogen-
eity.
More important than our speciﬁc ﬁndings for Russia, however, are the normat-
ive and methodological questions that are raised by these ﬁndings. Preference
heterogeneity is completely neglected by the standard approach to multidimen-
sional inequality measurement. Leaving pragmatic considerations of the avail-
ability of preference information aside, this position has been justiﬁed on norm-
ative grounds. There seems to be a certain distrust of individual preferences
in the capability approach, for instance (Sen, 1985). The capability approach
has been very inﬂuential in shaping the multidimensional approach towards the
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measurement of well-being, inequality, and poverty. Already before Sen (1985),
Kolm (1977) suggested in his seminal article that a common well-being meas-
ure could be seen as the observer's evaluation of the individual welfare, and
Scanlon (1975) wrote that the common objective opinion on what a good life is
and what constitutes well-being is rooted in some reasoned social agreement on
basic components of well-being and on the relative `urgency' of claims to diﬀer-
ent goods. As we have seen, the dominance approach does not depart from the
basic idea that there is one underlying common well-being measure, but intro-
duces the additional twist that there may be uncertainty about this reasoned
social agreement or a lack of consensus between diﬀerent ethical observers.
As emphasized by preferentialists, the argumentation in favour of neglecting
individual preferences has a strong perfectionist ﬂavour. They claim that in a
pluralist society with widely divergent opinions about what constitutes a good
life, public policy in general, and inequality measurement in particular, cannot
neglect these divergences and should therefore take up preference heterogeneity.
The diﬀerence between the two approaches is perhaps illustrated most strik-
ingly by their evaluation of the hypothetical situation in which all individuals
in society have the same objective outcomes. According to the standard mul-
tidimensional measurement literature, no ethically relevant inequality remains
in that situation. If one takes preferences into account, however, the match
between the outcomes and the preferences is brought into the picture, and it is
seen as ethically relevant that diﬀerent individuals can attach diﬀerent weights
to the diﬀerent dimensions and may therefore have a diﬀerent well-being, even
when their objective outcomes are the same.
Multidimensional inequality measures and dominance approaches are arguably
the best way to proceed if one believes that individuals do not have well-deﬁned
conceptions of the good life, or that, even when they exist, it is impossible
to know them, or that, even when they exist and one can approximate them,
one should not do so, but rather implement an objective conception of the
good life (Decancq et al. (2015b)). If, on the other hand, one does believe
that individuals can form a well-considered opinion about what is important in
their own life, that these preferences can be reasonably (although imperfectly)
approximated, and that they should be respected in a pluralist society, then
one should introduce preference heterogeneity into the measurement of well-
being inequality. This is essentially a normative debate, to which we did not
contribute in this paper. What we have shown, however, are the stakes of the
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debate. The normative choices determining the role of preference heterogeneity
have a crucial eﬀect on the resulting well-being inequality. They do matter.
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